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Abstract: This paper is the first to show that financial institutions may be effectively 
undercapitalized as a result of incomplete consolidation of minority ownership. Using two 
approaches – consolidating the minority-owned affiliates with the parent or deducting equity 
investments in minority ownership from the parent’s capital – we find that the effective 
capitalization ratios of small US bank holding companies (BHCs) are substantially lower than 
the reported ratios. Empirical evidence suggests that the effectively lower capitalization ratios 
are associated with higher riskiness at the BHC level. Capital adjustments following pro 
forma consolidation better capture the additional risks than capital adjustments in the form of 
equity deductions for investments in minority-owned affiliates. These findings have 
important implications for the regulation of bank capital.    
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The recent financial crisis has shown the importance of bank capital in determining bank 
stability. Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that higher levels of pre-crisis capital increased a 
bank’s probability of survival during the crisis. Similarly, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and 
Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2013) find that banks that were better 
capitalized before the crisis had a better stock market performance during the crisis. 
The thrust of post-crisis regulatory banking-sector reform has been to require banks to 
hold more and higher-quality capital. One issue addressed by policy makers concerns the 
regulatory treatment of a bank’s investments in nonconsolidated banking subsidiaries. To be 
compliant with Basel III, in March 2014 the US has started to require commercial banks 
filing Call Reports to deduct part of their investments in unconsolidated banking subsidiaries 
from their Tier 1 capital in recognition of the risks posed by such investments.2 Before 2014, 
the US only required large bank holding companies (BHCs) to make such a deduction from 
Tier 1 capital, but this regulation did not apply to small BHCs, which constitute the vast 
majority of the number of BHCs in the United States.   
This paper is the first to provide empirical evidence of the capital arbitrage opportunities 
offered to financial institutions by the nonconsolidation of their affiliates. These capital 
arbitrage opportunities are identified by analyzing the period 2000-2013 which is when large 
BHCs were subject to a minimum leverage ratio requirement but small BHCs were not 
subject to such a requirement, and by extension did not have to adjust their regulatory 
leverage ratio for their nonconsolidated investments in banking affiliates.3 Although our 
empirical analysis focuses on small BHCs, it provides insights into the appropriate capital 
                                                             
2 According to Basel III, investments in equity or regulatory capital instruments issued by banks or securities 
firms are risk-weighted at 250% unless deduction applies. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010, 
p. 26). 
 




regulatory treatment of investments in banking affiliates that apply to large BHCs as well. By 
focusing on investments in affiliates, our analysis allows to directly identify capital arbitrage 
using publicly available balance sheet information, and therefore contributes to the literature 
on the regulatory arbitrage and forbearance that has been hampered by the limited 
information content of publicly available information (an exception is Agarwal et al. (2014) 
who have used confidential supervisory information to infer regulatory capital forbearance).  
Specifically, we document the use of minority-owned banking affiliates by small BHCs, 
and we consider their implications for effective capitalization and for risk taking. To assess 
the capitalization implications, we perform a counterfactual, pro forma consolidation of 
minority-owned affiliates for the parent BHC. This exercise yields a ‘decompressed’ BHC 
with larger, ‘decompressed’ assets than actually reported assets, but with equal equity and 
hence a lower ‘decompressed’ leverage ratio calculated as the ratio of equity to 
‘decompressed’ assets.  
To be able to consolidate a BHC’s minority-owned affiliates, we use information on its 
entire corporate structure, including the ownership relationships among its constituent parts, 
as reported to the Federal Reserve and made available by the National Information Center 
(NIC). For the sample of small BHCs where we can complete the decompression exercise, we 
find that decompression reduces the leverage ratio by 26% on average.  
As an alternative to pro rata consolidation, we consider that the parent BHC is required 
to deduct its investments in nonconsolidated banking subsidiaries from its own equity. 
Theoretically, we show that this ‘deduction method’ of adjusting the parent bank’s reported 
leverage ratio is less accurate than the pro rata consolidation of these affiliates by way of the 
‘decompression method’. For the benchmark case of a parent firm that has a single minority-
owned subsidiary with equal reported leverage ratios and full deduction of the parent’s equity 
investment in its subsidiary from its regulatory capital, we show that the ‘deduction method’ 
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leads to an adjusted leverage ratio that is too low relative to the ‘decompressed’ leverage 
ratio. Consistent with this, for our sample of small BHCs we find empirically that the BHC’s 
leverage ratio after adjustment through deduction on average is lower than the 
‘decompressed’ leverage ratio.  
BHC risk is expected to reflect the lower leverage ratios that follow from decompression 
or deduction. In line with this, we find evidence that a bank’s Z-score (a commonly used 
measure of bank stability that is inversely related to bank risk) is negatively related to 
calculated downward leverage ratio adjustments, while the standard deviation of its return on 
equity (an alternative measure of bank risk) is positively related to these adjustments. This is 
evidence that small US BHCs were able to increase their riskiness for a given reported 
leverage ratio by investing in nonconsolidated banking affiliates. These results provide 
evidence of a direct link between capital arbitrage and the risk taking behavior of banks. 
Furthermore, capital ratio adjustments following decompression are more closely associated 
with bank risk than the alternative capital ratio adjustments following deduction. This 
suggests that capital ratio adjustments using the decompression method are preferred, in line 
with our theoretical analysis.   
Several papers examine how banks have used off-balance-sheet structures other than 
nonconsolidated banking affiliates to arbitrage capital regulations.4 Acharya, Schnabl and 
Suarez (2013) analyze how banks have deployed asset-backed commercial paper conduits 
enhanced with liquidity guarantees to reduce their regulatory capital requirements for a 
sample of large US and European banks over the 2000-2006 period. Shin (2009) argues that 
securitization enabled the banking system to materially expand credit leading up to the crisis 
by increasing effective leverage of the banking system. Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) 
                                                             
4See Acharya and Ryan (2016, pp. 319-232) for a discussion of channels by which banks’ financial reporting for 
securitizations related to the consolidation decision affect financial stability. 
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provide empirical evidence for a sample of large US banks that off-balance-sheet leverage as 
implicit in derivatives positions and securitizations contributed to bank risk as measured by 
bank stock price variability in the pre-crisis period. Calomiris and Mason (2004), however, 
conclude that US banks used off-balance-sheet conduits with implicit recourse to hold credit 
card receivables for efficient contracting reasons rather than to arbitrage capital adequacy 
rules. 
Off-balance-sheet structures such as nonconsolidated, minority-owned banks do not only 
enable banks to operate with low effective capitalization rates, but they may also provide 
banks with incentives to increase the riskiness of their assets. Furlong and Keeley (1989) 
show that a lowly capitalized bank optimally chooses a riskier asset portfolio. Furthermore, 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011) model how better 
capitalized banks have a stronger incentive to monitor their borrowers, thereby reducing the 
riskiness of their loan portfolio.  
In related research, Kahn and Winton (2004) show that banks may optimally place more 
and less risky assets in separate subsidiaries to contain risk-shifting incentives for the overall 
banking organization. Slovin and Sushka (1997) further find that firms generally may be able 
to enhance financing flexibility by maintaining a parent-subsidiary organizational form.5  
Mian and Smith (1990) examine whether Fortune 500 US firms report their financial 
subsidiaries on a consolidated or unconsolidated basis in 1985.6 These authors show that 
consolidation is more likely in case of greater operational, financial and informational 
interdependence between the parent and the subsidiary, possibly reflecting that 
interdependence makes consolidated accounting data more useful for internal control 
                                                             
5 Desai et al. (2004) find that multinational, nonfinancial firms with wholly owned affiliates rather than joint 
ventures expand intrafirm trade and technology transfer. In addition, Chang, Chung and Moon (2013) find that 
wholly owned subsidiaries outperform joint ventures in industries characterized by high levels of intangible 
assets. 
6 Before the adoption of Financial Accounting Standard 94 in 1987, US firms had discretion regarding the 
consolidation of majority-owned financial subsidiaries. 
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purposes. Further, they do not find that the use of unconsolidated financial subsidiaries is 
associated with the use of other off-balance-sheet financing such as operating leases and 
unfunded pension benefits. This is taken to be evidence against the hypothesis that US firms 
use unconsolidated subsidiaries in order to reduce the parent firm’s effective capitalization 
rate. Most of the large firms examined in Mian and Smith (1990), however, are not banks and 
hence do not face incentives to increase their de facto leverage by using off-balance-sheet 
financing so as to shift risk towards the financial safety net.  
The contribution of this paper is to show that small US BHCs were able to use 
nonconsolidated financial institutions to increase their effective leverage resulting in 
additional BHC risk. Importantly, our empirical results provide lessons about the appropriate 
method and size of the adjustment of BHC capitalization for investments in nonconsolidated 
banking firms that translate to large BHCs as well. In particular, our research shows that 
leverage ratio adjustments following a pro rata consolidation better reflect the risks associated 
with nonconsolidated banking subsidiaries than leverage ratios adjustments following a 
deduction approach. This finding suggests that the direction of pertinent regulatory reform at 
the Basel level has been misguided, as Basel II generally provided a choice between pro rata 
consolidation and deduction, while Basel III prescribes a deduction approach (see Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006 and 2010).   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the accounting 
and regulatory treatment of minority-owned banking affiliates in the US. Section 3 compares 
the ‘decompression’ and ‘deduction’ methods of adjusting a bank’s reported capital for its 
minority-owned affiliates.. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 presents empirical 
evidence of the relationships between BHC risk variables and computed gaps between 
reported and adjusted BHC leverage ratios to reflect the minority ownership of banking 




2. Accounting and regulatory treatment of minority-owned banks in the US 
According to US GAAP, parent banks need to consolidate the subsidiaries that they 
unilaterally control as indicated by Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 51 issued in 1959. 
As traditionally interpreted, majority ownership of a subsidiary, defined as an ownership 
share of common stock exceeding 50%, is taken to imply control.7  
Whether or not a subsidiary is consolidated into the parent’s balance sheet may have little 
impact on the parent firm’s requirement to stand behind its subsidiary. According to the 
Federal Reserve Board’s ‘source of strength’ principle, BHCs are expected to support their 
distressed banking affiliates and to effectively guarantee their liabilities with their own 
capital.8 Accordingly, Gilbert (1991) finds that very large BHCs tend to inject more capital 
into their distressed subsidiaries than other bank owners inject into their banks as evidence 
that these BHCs act as a source of strength. Similarly, Ashcraft (2008) shows that distressed 
banks affiliated with a multi-bank holding company receive more capital, recover more 
quickly and are less likely to fail over the next year than other banks. These two studies do 
not distinguish between consolidated and nonconsolidated affiliates, but there is no reason 
why the source of strength principle should not apply to nonconsolidated banking affiliates. 
                                                             
7 According to the glossary of the FR Y-9C report, a majority-owned subsidiary of the reporting holding 
company is a subsidiary in which the parent bank directly or indirectly owns more than 50 percent of the 
outstanding voting stock. On the other hand, minority ownership takes the form of an associated company or a 
joint venture, which are not required to be consolidated into the parent’s balance sheet. An associated company 
is a corporation in which the bank, directly or indirectly, owns 20 to 50 percent of the outstanding voting stock 
and over which the bank exercises significant influence. A corporate joint venture is a corporation owned and 
operated by a group of banks or other businesses, no one of which has a majority interest. The equity ownership 
in associated companies and joint ventures shall be accounted for using the equity method of accounting. 
8 A summary of the doctrine can be found in Gilbert (1991). A legal reference is the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Sec. 38A, stating: “SOURCE OF STRENGTH. (a) HOLDING 
COMPANIES.--The appropriate Federal banking agency for a bank holding company or savings and loan 
holding company shall require the bank holding company or savings and loan holding company to serve as a 
source of financial strength for any subsidiary of the bank holding company or savings and loan holding 
company that is a depository institution. (b) OTHER COMPANIES.--If an insured depository institution is not 
the subsidiary of a bank holding company or savings and loan holding company, the appropriate Federal 
banking agency for the insured depository institution shall require any company that directly or indirectly 
controls the insured depository institution to serve as a source of financial strength for such institution.” 
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There thus is little, if any, scope for BHCs to use nonconsolidated, minority-owned affiliates 
to offload asset risk.9 
To prevent capital regulatory arbitrage related to investments in nonconsolidated 
subsidiaries, the US Bank Holding Company Act stipulated that one-half of the aggregate 
investments in unconsolidated banking subsidiaries had to be deducted from Tier 1 capital 
(and the other one-half from Tier 2 capital) during our sample period. Importantly, however, 
this regulation only applied to large BHCs. More broadly, small BHCs have been exempt 
from the risk-based capital regulations applicable to large BHCs and commercial banks, and 
also from the minimum leverage ratio requirement, which specified that the ratio of Tier 1 
capital to total assets should be no less than 3%.10  
The different regulatory approaches to large and small BHCs have also been reflected in 
the regulatory reports that BHCs have been required to file with the Federal Reserve. 
Specifically, large BHCs have been filing form FR Y-9C, which required a deduction of half 
of nonconsolidated investments in banking and finance subsidiaries from Tier 1 capital. Small 
BHCs instead have filed form FR Y-9SP which does not require BHCs to report a Tier 1 
capital measure reflecting such a deduction.  
Similarly to small BHCs, commercial banks also were not required to adjust their 
                                                             
9 In line with this, the Bank Holding Company Act states that “experience has shown that banking organizations 
stand behind the losses of affiliated institutions, such as joint ventures and associated companies, in order to 
protect the reputation of the organization as a whole. In some cases, this has led to losses that have exceeded the 
investments in such organizations.” 
10 The exemption of small BHCs from the minimum leverage ratio requirement is stated as follows:  
“The tier 1 leverage guidelines apply on a consolidated basis to any bank holding company with consolidated 
assets of $500 million or more. The tier 1 leverage guidelines also apply on a consolidated basis to any bank 
holding company with consolidated assets of less than $500 million if the holding company (i) is engaged in 
significant nonbanking activities either directly or through a nonbank subsidiary; (ii) conducts significant off-
balance sheet activities (including securitization and asset management or administration) either directly or 
through a nonbank subsidiary; or (iii) has a material amount of debt or equity securities outstanding (other than 
trust preferred securities) that are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Federal Reserve 
may apply the tier 1 leverage guidelines at its discretion to any bank holding company, regardless of asset size, 
if such action is warranted for supervisory purposes.” 
See https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/7500-4500.html#fdic7500appendixd . 
The threshold of $ 500 million for a BHC to be large applied from March 2006, and was subsequently raised to 
$ 1 billion in March 2015 (see Appendix A).  
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reported Tier 1 capital for any nonconsolidated investments in banking and finance 
subsidiaries during the 2000-2013 period in the Call reports filed with the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC). Commercial banks, however, have been required 
to make such adjustments since March 2014, when Basel III started to be implemented in the 
US (see Appendix A for details on the regulatory reporting requirements as to the Tier 1 
capital measures that have applied to US BHCs of different sizes, and to commercial banks 
during the 2000-2014 period).  
Small BHCs continue to be exempt from Basel III, and also from any requirement to 
adjust their capitalization for their investments in minority-owned affiliates. According to 
Killian (2015), there were 4,248 ‘small’ BHCs with assets less than $ 1 billion at the end of 
2014, representing 88.0% of the total number of BHCs. These small BHCs had combined 
assets of $ 436 billion, amounting to 2.4 % of the total assets of BHCs. These figures indicate 
that small BHCs constitute a material share of the US banking market.11  
In the empirical work below, we examine the relationship between BHC risk and 
investments in nonconsolidated banking subsidiaries for a sample of small BHCs. Data 
limitations prevent us from conducting a similar analysis for a sample of large BHCs to see 
whether the regulation in force applicable to large BHCs was adequate to eliminate capital 
arbitrage opportunities. However our analysis of small BHCs also provides insights into the 
appropriate capital regulatory treatment of minority investments for large BHCs. 
 
3. Adjusting the leverage ratio for minority-owned subsidiaries 
In this section, we examine the ‘decompression’ and ‘deduction’ methods of adjusting a 
parent bank’s reported leverage ratio for its minority-owned subsidiaries. Specifically, we 
                                                             
11 Killian (2015) discusses a range of strategies that banks can use to reduce their effective capitalization 
through the use of a small BHC structure, including letting the small BHC (rather than any subsidiary bank) 
invest in financial institution capital instruments. 
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outline and compare the two methods for the case of a parent bank that is a minority owner of 
a single subsidiary. A description of how these two adjustment methods can be extended to 
deal with more complicated banking structures is provided in Appendix B. 
The parent is assumed to report its minority ownership of the subsidiary as an 
investment among other assets. The parent bank act as a source of strength for its subsidiary, 
which implies that the parent’ s equity is required to absorb any losses stemming from the 
assets of the subsidiary proportionally to the parent’s ownership share of the subsidiary. 
The parent has assets, 𝐴𝑝, liabilities, 𝐿𝑝, and equity, 𝐸𝑝. The reported leverage ratio 
of the parent, 𝜆𝑝, is given by 𝐸𝑝/𝐴𝑝. Similarly, the subsidiary has assets, 𝐴𝑠, liabilities, 𝐿𝑠, 
and equity, 𝐸𝑠, with a reported leverage ratio, 𝜆𝑠, given by 𝐸𝑠/𝐴𝑠. 
The parent owns a share α of the equity of the subsidiary, implying an equity 
investment of α𝐸𝑠 in the subsidiary. The parent’s ownership share is assumed to be non-
controlling, i.e. α ≤ 50%, so that the subsidiary is not consolidated. Instead, the equity 
investment of α𝐸𝑠 is carried as an investment implying the parent’s outside assets, 𝐴𝑝
𝑜 ,  are 
equal to 𝐴𝑝 − α𝐸𝑠. Figure 1, Part A and Part B, display the balance sheets of the parent and 
the subsidiary, respectively.  
The decompression method of adjusting the parent’s reported leverage ratio for its 
minority-owned subsidiary pro forma consolidates the minority-owned subsidiary with the 
parent bank proportionally to the parent banks ownership share, α.12 Specifically, on the 
parent’s balance sheet we replace the equity investment, α𝐸𝑠, by the proportionally owned 
subsidiary assets, 𝛼𝐴𝑠, given rise to assets for the decompressed parent equal to 𝐴𝑝 +
                                                             
12 Consolidation of the subsidiary’s assets on the parent bank’s balance in proportion to the ownership share α 
provides a more accurate picture of the asset exposure of the parent bank’s equity holders than full 
consolidation. Consolidation of a majority-owned subsidiary according to GAAP implies fully placing the assets 
and liabilities of the subsidiary on the parent’s balance sheet. The minority equity ownership of the subsidiary 
by third parties is placed within equity, but separate from the parent’s equity according to an amendment of ARB 
51 by the FSAB in 2008.  
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α(𝐴𝑠 − 𝐸𝑠). The leverage ratio after decompression, 𝜆𝑝,𝑐, is defined as the parent’s reported 
equity divided by its decompressed assets. Hence, 𝜆𝑝,𝑐 =
𝐸𝑝
𝐴𝑝+α(𝐴𝑠−𝐸𝑠)
, or equivalently 
𝜆𝑝,𝑐 =
𝜆𝑝
1 + αρ(1 − 𝜆𝑠)
 
                 (1) 
where 𝜌 is the relative asset size of the subsidiary, i.e. 𝐴𝑠/𝐴𝑝. The extension of the balance 
sheet through decompression implies that the leverage ratio after decompression is less than 
the parent’s reported leverage ratio, i.e. 𝜆𝑝,𝑐 < 𝜆𝑝.
13  
 In the empirical work, we will use two measures of the reduction in the leverage ratio 
brought about by decompression. First, we consider the absolute adjustment of the reported 
leverage ratio, 𝛿𝑐,𝑎 , given by  𝜆𝑝 − 𝜆𝑝,𝑐  or 𝜆𝑝 −
𝜆𝑝
1+𝛼𝜌(1−𝜆𝑠)
. Second, the relative 
adjustment,  𝛿𝑐,𝑟, is computed as 
𝜆𝑝−𝜆𝑝,𝑐
𝜆𝑝




 Alternatively, the deduction method adjusts the parent’s reported capital for its minority-
owned subsidiary by deducting the equity investment in the subsidiary, α𝐸𝑠, from the parent’s 
reported capital, 𝐸𝑝, yielding an adjusted capital, 𝐸𝑝 − α𝐸𝑠. The leverage ratio after deduction, 





𝜆𝑝,𝑑 = 𝜆𝑝 − αρ𝜆𝑠 
                 (2) 
Deduction also yields a lower leverage ratio than the parent’s reported leverage ratio, i. e 
𝜆𝑝,𝑑 < 𝜆𝑝. We can again construct two measures of the reduction in the parent’s reported 
leverage ratio brought about by deduction. First, the absolute adjustment 𝜆𝑝 − 𝜆𝑝,𝑑, denoted, 
                                                             
13 The leverage ratio after decompression, 𝜆𝑝,𝑐, declines with the subsidiary’s relative size, 𝜌, but increases 
with its reported leverage ratio, λs. 
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𝛿𝑑,𝑎, is given by αρλs, while the relative adjustment  
𝜆𝑝−𝜆𝑝,𝑑
𝜆𝑝





The deduction method is in principle easier to implement than the decompression 
method, as the only information about the subsidiary that is required is the parent’s equity 
investment in the minority-owned subsidiary as reported on the parent’s balance sheet, while 
the decompression method in addition requires information about the subsidiary’s assets. The 
facility of the deduction method may explain that relevant US regulations require banks to 
use a deduction method rather than a decompression method.  
A disadvantage of the deduction method, however, is that it is a rather crude way to 
adjust the parent’s reported capital for its minority-owned subsidiary relative to the 
decompression method. To see this, note that the decompression method is ‘correct’ on the 
assumption that the subsidiary’s assets and the parent’s outside assets are similar in terms of 
risk and return, implying that proportionally equal amounts of outside capital are required to 
support the two sets of outside assets.14  
Comparing the two methods, we can consider the ‘bias’ the deduction method introduces 
in the adjusted leverage ratio after deduction relative to the ‘correct’ leverage ratio after 
decompression. Specifically, this ‘bias’, Δ, is the difference between the leverage ratios after 
deduction and after decompression, i.e., 𝜆𝑝,𝑑 − 𝜆𝑝,𝑐, which implies 
Δ = 𝜆𝑝 − 𝛼𝜌𝜆𝑠 −
𝜆𝑝
1 + 𝛼𝜌(1 − 𝜆𝑠)
 
                   (3) 
The difference, Δ , can be either positive or negative, depending on the parameters 𝛼, 
                                                             
14 A shortcoming of our leverage ratio adjustment measures is that they ignore the existence of any internal debt 
relationships between the bank and the subsidiary. We do not take into account internal debt, as US banks are 




𝜆𝑠, 𝜆𝑝, and 𝜌. For the benchmark case of equal reported leverage ratios of the parent and the 
subsidiary, i.e. 𝜆𝑠 = 𝜆𝑝, we have Δ < 0, indicating that the leverage ratio resulting from 
deduction is less than the leverage ratio resulting from decompression. This suggests that the 
deduction method on average will yield an adjusted leverage ratio that is too low. Our 
calculations in the empirical section confirm that the leverage ratio with deduction on average 
is lower than the leverage ratio after decompression.  
In Table 1, we present a numerical example where we calculate the leverage ratio 
adjustments under decompression and deduction for a parent bank with a single minority-
owned subsidiary bank.  
 
4. The data 
BHCs are required to report information on their organizational structures via form FR 
Y-6 and changes in organizational charts via form FR Y-10. This structural information can 
be represented as a series of ownership relationships where each relationship is characterized 
by a parent institution, a subsidiary institution, a percentage of direct ownership, a starting 
date, and an ending date, if applicable. Information on ownerships relationships among US 
financial institutions along these lines is collected in the control relationship database 
available from the National Information Center (NIC) repository. Using these ownership 
relationships, we have reconstructed the hierarchies of US BHCs on a quarterly basis over the 
years 2000-2013, preceding the introduction of new US regulations to adjust a commercial 
bank’s equity for investments in minority-owned financial institutions in the first quarter of 
2014 as reflecting in the Call report. 
 Our assemblage results in 8,179 top-tier BHCs, and 43,137 top-to-bottom ownership 
chains. Chains vary in length, with the longest chain having 12 layers including the top-tier 
BHC. Next, we restrict the sample to small top-tier BHCs that file report FR 9-SP rather than 
14 
 
report Y9-C, as only small BHCs are exempt from constructing and reporting a leverage ratio 
that is adjusted for investments in minority-owned subsidiaries. This reduces the sample to 
5,258 top-tier BHCs that have 9,463 top-to-bottom ownership chains with a maximum length 
of 6 layers.  
The hierarchies can harbor a range of financial institutions, including BHCs, national 
banks, non-member banks, and foreign banks.15 Appendix C provides a classification of 
financial institutions active in the US. Importantly for our analysis, some types of financial 
institutions, but not all, are required to report accounting information to US regulators 
including their equity and assets. BHCs, national banks, and non-member banks, for instance, 
are required to file standard regulatory reports, while foreign banks are not (see Appendix C).  
Our leverage ratio adjustments only take into account minority-owned affiliates that are 
required to file regulatory reports providing accounting data, as we need basic accounting 
data for the subsidiary to adjust the parent’s leverage ratio through either decompression or 
deduction.16 Based on only reporting subsidiary financial institutions, we can divide the top 
BHCs into two groups based on whether they have at least one minority-owned financial 
institution somewhere in the overall hierarchy. Based on this criterion, we can distinguish 268 
small top-tier BHCs with minority ownership, and 5,048 small top-tier BHCs without such 
ownership.17 Figure 2 shows that BHCs with minority-owned affiliates are relatively 
complex, as these banks’ distribution of the number of layers indicates relatively more layers. 
In fact, banks with and without minority ownership have on average 2.9 and 2.2 layers.18 
                                                             
15 A national bank is a commercial bank with a charter approved by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) rather than by a state banking department. National banks are required to be members of the 
Federal Reserve System and belong to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. A non-member bank is a 
commercial bank that is state-chartered and not a member of the Federal Reserve System. 
16 Our adjustments of the parent’s reported leverage ratio for its ownership of minority-owned financial 
institutions may be too small as we ignore minority ownership of non-reporting financial institutions, in 
particular foreign financial institutions. Similarly, we ignore the parent’s minority ownership of any non-
financial firms. 
17 58 small top-tier BHCs had minority ownership in certain periods and then switched to majority ownership 
over our sample period. 
18 Previously Avraham, Selvaggi, and Vickery (2012) have presented statistics on the complexity of US bank 
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Similarly, Figure 3 shows that BHCs with minority-owned affiliates have a distribution of the 
number of affiliates implying relatively many affiliates. BHCs with and without minority-
owned affiliates have on average 3 and 1.6 affiliates.  
 For BHCs with minority ownership, we aim to adjust the reported leverage ratio through 
applying the decompression and deduction methods. To do the decompression, we need to 
have information on the equity and assets of pertinent affiliates in the hierarchies as well on 
their ownership relationships, while the deduction approach only requires information on the 
parent’s investments in their minority-owned affiliates, calculated as the ownership share of a 
subsidiary by the parent times the equity of a subsidiary. Accounting data are matched to all 
reporting financial institutions in the hierarchies using information from the Y9-SP forms and 
the Call Report.19 This results in semi-annual data, as small BHCs file the FR Y-9SP report 
on a semi-annual basis. 
 We consider our attempt to adjust a BHC’s reported leverage ratio through 
decompression successful only if we can complete the pro forma consolidation for all 
reporting minority-owned financial affiliates located anywhere in the BHC’s hierarchical 
structure.20 Obstacles we can encounter are missing accounting data for a reporting minority-
owned subsidiary (despite the reporting requirement), missing ownership data in the control 
relationship database, and, not least, non-reporting financial institutions positioned 
somewhere in the tree above a reporting minority-owned subsidiary that ‘blocks’ its 
consolidation. Our requirement that we need to be able to consolidate all reporting minority-
owned affiliates in practice means that we can only complete the decompression for BHCs 
with relatively small banking hierarchies.  
                                                             
holding companies without making a distinction between majority-owned and minority-owned affiliates. 
19 For small BHCs, consolidated assets are available from form Y-9SP, while for banks consolidated assets are 
available from form the Call Report. 
20 We also disregard observations where the parent BHC experiences asset growth higher than 200% or has a 
reported leverage ratio in excess of 70%. 
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In fact, we are able to complete the decompression for a sample of 93 top-tier BHCs, 
yielding 635 BHC-quarter observations. These BHCs on average report a capital ratio of 
0.1004, while the average leverage ratio after decompression is 0.0637 as shown in Panel A 
of Table 2 (see Appendix D for variable descriptions and data sources).21 
Figure 4 shows time plots of the average yearly reported leverage ratio and the leverage 
ratio after decompression over the 2000-2013 period. Both peaked before the crisis in 2005, 
and went down during the crisis and its aftermath. Interestingly, the leverage ratio after 
decompression appears to be more stable over time than the reported leverage ratio, which 
suggests that some of the time variation of the reported leverage ratio materializes on account 
of varying ownership of minority-owned financial institutions. The average difference 
between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after decompression is 0.0367, or 
36.6% of the reported leverage ratio.  
Figure 5 plots the time trends of the absolute and relative adjustments of the leverage 
ratio following decompression. These adjustments are seen to have peaked in 2005, and to 
have declined subsequently as evidence of reduced use of minority-owned financial affiliates 
driving a wedge between the reported and adjusted leverage ratios.  
Figure 6 plots the leverage ratio after decompression against the reported leverage ratio 
using biannual data. As discussed before, small BHCs have been exempt from a formal 
leverage ratio requirement. All the same, the figure is instructive as to how small BHCs could 
have used investments in nonconsolidated banking affiliates to circumvent a hypothetical 
leverage ratio requirement of 0.03 if it had been in place. Specifically, there are 66 
observations in the figure (out of 635) where the reported leverage ratio exceeds 0.03 but 
where the leverage ratio after decompression is less than 0.03. These BHCs would be 
problematic from a regulatory point of view if a leverage ratio requirement existed, as they 
                                                             
21 Note that these averages are for the observations in the regressions reported in Table 2. 
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meet a hypothetical leverage requirement of 0.03 on the basis of the reported leverage ratio, 
but not on the basis of the leverage ratio after decompression.  
The sample of BHCs to which we can successfully apply the deduction method is 
somewhat larger, as deduction only requires information on ownership relationships and on 
the equity of minority-owned affiliates. We can apply the deduction method to 131 top BHCs 
with minority-owned financial institutions, providing a sample of 958 semi-annual 
observations. The average calculated deduction from the leverage ratio is 0.0513 as seen in 
Panel B of Table 2, somewhat larger than the average reduction in the leverage ratio of 
0.0367 if decompression is applied. In specific cases, however, the deduction method gives 
rise to a smaller downward adjustment of the leverage ratio than the decompression method, 
as suggested by the theoretical analysis of section 3. To illustrate this, Figure 7 plots the 
leverage ratio after deduction (relative to the reported leverage ratio) against the leverage 
ratio after decompression (relative to the reported leverage ratio) for banks where both 
adjustment methods can be applied. For observations above the 45o –line, the deduction 
method gives rise to a smaller adjustment to the reported leverage ratio than the 
decompression method. The majority of the observations are below this line, indicating that 
the deduction method gives rise to a relatively large downward adjustment in the leverage 
ratio.22 
In the empirical work, we examine whether bank risk reflects effective capitalization 
obtained through decompression or deduction. We consider two indices of bank risk. First, 
the Z-score is a measure of bank solvency that reflects the number of standard deviations that 
a bank’s return on assets can fall below its average level before the bank becomes insolvent 
(see Roy, 1952). The Z-score is calculated as the logarithm of the sum of the return on assets 
and the equity to assets ratio divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets 
                                                             
22 The figure does not show that the leverage ratio after deduction is negative for 219 (out of 958) observations.  
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(calculated using a rolling window of three biannual observations). Second, earnings 
volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the return on equity based on three 
biannual observations.  
A nice feature of the Z-score is that it is not affected by the consolidation of minority-
owned financial institutions as long as the outside assets of the parent and the financial 
affiliates are uniform (so that there is no change in the relative valuation of these assets over 
time). In that instance, consolidation simply blows up the assets of the parent bank by a 
constant factor in each period, leaving the calculated Z-score unchanged (as the return on 
assets, the equity to assets ratio, and the standard deviation of the return on assets are all 
scaled by assets). Earnings volatility is neutral to the degree of consolidation even more 
broadly, as neither yearly earnings nor the parent’s equity are affected by consolidation by 
way of decompression.  
While being unaffected by consolidation, the Z-score and earnings volatility do reflect 
the BHC’s overall risk (which stems from the bank’s overall outside assets) relative to the 
parent BHC’s equity. A BHC with minority-owned affiliates, in particular, will carry the 
economic risk of relatively more outside assets for a given amount of equity, and hence 
should display a lower Z-score and higher earnings volatility. To test this, in the empirical 
work we relate the Z-score and earnings volatility to our leverage ratio adjustments calculated 
using either the decompression or deduction methods, as proxies for the intensity of a bank’s 
use of minority-owned financial institutions. We hypothesize that a bank’s Z-score (earnings 
volatility) will be lower (higher) the larger the calculated capital adjustments while 
controlling for the parent banks’ reported leverage ratio. 
 The regressions include four BHC-level control variables. First, size is calculated as the 
logarithm of total assets.23 A larger BHC may be less risky due to greater asset 
                                                             
23 The few reported items in form Y-9SP limit our choice of control variables.  
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diversification. Second, asset growth is the growth rate of assets divided by the GDP deflator. 
Faster growing BHCs may be more risky, as fast growth may only be realizable at a cost of a 
more risky loan portfolio and other bank investments. Third, concentration measures the 
share of a BHC’s assets in the aggregate assets of all banks in a county. BHCs with a larger 
market share may be either less or more risky.24 Finally, number of offspring is total number 
of offspring at various levels regardless of equity ownership. 
 Panels A and B of Table 3 provide correlations among the bank risk, capitalization, and 
control variables for the samples of banks to which we have been able to apply the 
decompression and deduction methods, respectively.  
To conclude this section, it is interesting to consider how the BHC and banking market 
characteristics that serve as controls in the basic regression analysis correlate with whether a 
BHC has a minority-owned subsidiary and also with the share of minority-owned affiliates in 
total affiliates.25 These correlations are displayed in Table 4. It is seen that BHC size 
correlates positively with the existence of a minority-owned subsidiary, but negatively with 
the share of minority-owned affiliates. The total number of offspring in turn is positively 
correlated with the existence of a minority-owned subsidiary as well as with the share of 
minority-owned affiliates. 
 
5. Empirical results 
In this section, we examine empirically the relationships between BHC risk, as proxied by 
the Z-score and earnings volatility variables, and the non-consolidation of minority-owned 
                                                             
24 Hellman, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000) argue that less competition induces prudent investments of banks in a 
static setting. Keeley (1990) find in a dynamic model that monopoly rents are conducive to bank stability. On 
the contrary, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that banks with monopoly power can extract rents by charging 
higher loans rates, which worsens the problem of moral hazard at the borrower level. As a consequence, market 
power may render bank more risky.  
25 Overall 268 out of 5,258, or 5.1%, of small BHCs have a minority-owned subsidiary, and 2.3% of affiliates is 
minority-owned, i.e. with an ownership share of 50% or less. 
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financial institutions, as reflected in calculated capital adjustments following the 
decompression and deductions methods. The regressions include the reported leverage ratio 
as one of the control variables. Further, semi-annual fixed effects are included, and standard 
errors are clustered at the BHC level.  
We start with considering regressions that include capital adjustments following 
decompression for the sample of BHCs to which decompression can be applied in Table 5. In 
regressions 1-6, the Z-score is the dependent variable.26 In regression 1, the reported 
leverage ratio obtains a positive coefficient of 3.315 that is significant at 5%, while the 
relative reduction following decompression obtains a negative coefficient of -1.570 that is 
significant at 1%. The negative coefficient for the relative capital adjustment variable 
suggests that the use of minority-owned affiliates increases bank risk. To assess the economic 
importance of this effect, we can consider a one standard deviation increase in the relative 
capital adjustment of 0.177, which reduces the Z-score by 0.278 (=0.177*1.570) amounting 
to 32% of the standard deviation of the Z-score of 0.862. This is a material effect. Among the 
control variables, the Z-score is negatively and significantly related to the concentration 
variable. A negative relationship between the Z-score and a bank’s market share is in line 
with research by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) who find that banks with higher market power 
are riskier. In regression 2, we alternatively include the absolute reduction in the leverage 
ratio following decompression, yielding a negative coefficient of -3.926 that is insignificant. 
Next, we consider the relationship between the Z-score and our capital adjustment 
variables separately for the pre-crisis period 2000q1-2007q2, and the crisis-and-aftermath 
period 2007q3-2013q4 to reflect that banks faced a more volatile environment during the 
crisis. Regressions 3-4 and 5-6 reflect the pre-crisis, and crisis and subsequent periods, 
                                                             




respectively. For the pre-crisis sample, the relative capital adjustment variable is negative and 
significant in regression 3. For the crisis-and-aftermath sample, the relative and absolute 
capital adjustments following decompression are both estimated with negative and significant 
coefficients in regressions 5 and 6, respectively.  
In regressions 7-12, the dependent variable is earnings volatility in regressions that are 
analogous to 1-6. In regression 7, the estimated coefficient for the relative capital reduction 
variable is positive and significant, suggesting that BHCs that make use of nonconsolidated 
financial affiliates are relatively risky. To examine the economic magnitude of the effect, we 
can see that a one standard deviation increase in the relative reduction of 0.177 implies an 
increase in earnings volatility of 0.019 (= 0.177*0.107), which is 26% of the standard 
deviation of earnings volatility of 0.074 amounting to a material effect. In regression 8, the 
absolute capital reduction also obtains a positive and significant coefficient. In regressions 9 
and 11, the relative capital adjustment variables obtain positive and significant coefficients 
for the pre-crisis and crisis-and-aftermath samples, respectively. 
In Table 6, we show analogous Z-score and earnings volatility regressions for an 
enlarged sample that includes all top-tier BHCs that do not report any minority-owned 
affiliates. The included relative and absolute reductions of the leverage ratio after 
decompression are statistically significant in all regressions in the table apart from 
regressions 1 and 3, providing additional evidence that nonconsolidated banking affiliates 
entail risks that are not reflecting in the reported leverage ratio. One caveat to these results, 
however, is that BHCs to which decompression can be applied and BHCs without minority 
ownership differ significantly in their size and other characteristics, as evident from Table 4. 
This suggests that this estimation may be subject to selection bias.  
As a remedy, we next consider a sample consisting of banks to which decompression is 
applied as well as banks without minority ownership constructed by applying propensity 
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score matching. To estimate the propensity scores, we use a probit model of a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 for a bank to which decompression has been applied, and zero 
otherwise. The explanatory variables are the set of bank-level controls in our estimations, i.e. 
the reported leverage ratio, size, asset growth, concentration, and the number of offspring. 
Having estimated the propensity score, we year by year match the set of decompressed banks 
with those banks without minority ownership that are closest in their propensity scores. We 
impose the common support condition that prohibits the perfect predictability of 
decompression given the observed covariates to ensure the existence of potential matches in 
the group of banks without minority ownership. In the end, we obtain a PSM sample 
composed of 78 decompressed bank and 406 banks without minority ownership.27 Columns 
4-6 of Table 7 shows that decompressed and non-decompressed banks in the PSM sample 
have average bank characteristics that do not differ significantly. 
Table 8 shows the results of bank risk regressions analogous to Table 5 for the PSM 
sample. The relative adjustment with decompression variable is estimated with insignificant 
coefficients, while the absolute adjustment with decompression variable has negative and 
significant coefficients in the Z-score regressions 2 and 6, and has positive and significant 
coefficients in the earnings volatility regressions 8 and 12. Hence, there is evidence that the 
leverage adjustment following decompression explains BHC risk after we control for 
differences in observed BHC characteristics between the groups of decompressed bank and 
banks without minority ownership.  
The sizes of the estimated coefficients in regressions 2, 6, 8, and 12 inform about the 
magnitude of the capital deductions, as shares of the calculated absolute leverage adjustments 
after decompression, that are necessary to control for the additional risk stemming from 
                                                             
27 We have 523 bank-year observations for the group of 78 decompressed banks. Note that a decompressed 
bank may be matched with a number of different banks without minority ownership in different years.  
23 
 
nonconsolidated banking affiliates. For these four regressions, the ratios of the coefficients on 
the absolute adjustment with decompression range and the reported leverage ratio and 
between 0.62 and 0.91. This suggests that the share of investments in nonconsolidated 
banking affiliates to be deducted from Tier 1 capital should be in the 0.62-0.91 range to 
adequately control for the additional risk. This estimated range is somewhat larger than the 
50% of investments in nonconsolidated banking affiliates that large BHCs were required to 
deduct from their Tier 1 capital during most of the sample period (see Appendix A). 
Next, we examine how bank risk is related to capital adjustments calculated using the 
deduction method as potential indices of the deployment of minority-owned affiliates. Table 9 
presents the results of BHC risk regressions including capital adjustment variables following 
the deduction method that are analogous to Table 5. In section 3, we argued that the 
decompression method is expected to yield more accurate capital adjustments than the 
deduction method. For this reason, we expect stronger relationships between BHC risk 
variables and capital adjustment variables if decompression rather than deduction is applied. 
Comparing Tables 5 and 9, this seems to be the case. The relative capital adjustment variable 
is negative and significant in Z-score regression 3, while the absolute (relative) capital 
adjustment variable is positive and significant in regressions 8 and 12 (regression 9). This 
shows that capital adjustments under deduction are useful in explaining bank risk, but the 
evidence is less strong than in Table 5. The relative capital adjustment variable, for instance, 
fails to be significant in the Z-score regression 1 of Table 9, while it is significant in the 
corresponding regression in Table 5. 
A shortcoming in comparing Table 5 based on capital adjustments following 
decompression with Table 9 based on capital adjustments following deduction is that the 
samples of BHCs differ. This follows from the fact that the deduction method can be applied 
to relatively more BHCs, as it requires less information. To remedy this, we performed bank 
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risk regressions including capital adjustment variables following the deduction method, but 
based on the sample of BHCs in Table 5 for which decompression as well as deduction are 
possible. In these unreported regressions, the included capital adjustment variable is 
significant at 10% in the corresponding regressions 3, 8 and 9 (with negative, positive, and 
positive coefficients, respectively). This provides additional evidence that capital adjustment 
following deduction is related to BHC risk taking. This evidence, however, is rather weak 
compared to the evidence of Table 5. This suggests that capital adjustments following 
decompression more accurately explain bank risk than the corresponding adjustments 
following deduction as motivated in section 3.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Small US BHCs do not need to consolidate their minority-owned financial affiliates. As a 
result, their effective rate of capitalization is lower than the reported one. In this paper, we 
consider two methods to adjust the capitalization rates of financial institutions for their 
minority-owned affiliates. First, one can pro forma consolidate the minority-owned financial 
institutions onto the balance sheet of the parent institutions. Second, one can deduct the 
parent institution’s equity investments in minority-owned financial institutions from the 
parent’s equity. Both methods lead to downward adjustments in leverage ratios.  
We argue that effective consolidation of minority-owned financial affiliates is the 
preferred method of adjusting reported leverage ratios. In fact, relative to this consolidation 
method, the deduction method produces biases in the adjustment that can be either positive or 
negative, depending on the exact structure of the overall financial institution. For the case of 
equal leverage ratios of a parent and a single minority-owned subsidiary, we show that the 
deduction method leads to a downward adjustment in the leverage ratio that is too large. 
For a sample of small US BHCs in the 2000-2013 period, we calculate the downward 
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adjustment in the leverage ratio using the two methods, showing that the downward 
adjustment using the deduction method on average is larger. 
 Empirically we find that BHC risk, as reflected in the Z-score and earnings volatility, is 
positively related to calculated downward adjustments in bank capitalization while 
controlling for reported capitalization. This implies that reported capitalization does not 
adequately reflect BHC risk as generated by minority-owned affiliates, and that small BHCs 
have been able to increase their riskiness for a given level of capitalization by maintaining 
nonconsolidated investments in banking affiliates. 
Overall, we find that capitalization adjustments using pro rata consolidation better reflect 
BHC risk than the alternative adjustments using the deduction method. This suggests that 
regulatory capitalization adjustments ideally follow a pro forma consolidation approach 
rather than the more simple deduction approach. As a corollary, the direction of recent 
regulatory reform at the Basel level appears to be misguided, as Basel II generally provided a 
choice between pro rata consolidation and deduction, while Basel III prescribes a deduction 
approach. Our estimated coefficients suggest that a share between 50% and 100% of any 
calculated capital adjustment should be subtracted from a parent institution’s equity to 
adequately control for the additional risks.  
Throughout the Basel II period, the US required large BHCs to implement a deduction for 
their unconsolidated investments in banking and finance subsidiaries consistent with Basel II. 
However, there were no corresponding deductions for small BHCs and banks filing Call 
reports. From March 2014, the US has been implementing Basel III and its deduction regime 
in the cases of large BHCs and banks (see Federal Reserve Board, 2013). 28 This reform in 
principle eliminates capital arbitrage opportunities related to nonconsolidated banking 
                                                             
28 The European Union correspondingly adopted a regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions 
in 2013 including required deductions from common equity Tier 1 for investments in nonconsolidated financial 
sector entities (see European Commission, 2013, section 3).  
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subsidiaries that were previously available to commercial banks. Small BHCs, however, 
continue to be exempt from any systematic risk-based capital requirements or formal leverage 
ratio requirement, and hence also from any capital deductions for their investments in 
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Appendix A. Regulatory treatment of nonconsolidated investments 
 
This appendix summarizes US regulation as to whether US BHCs and commercial banks had 
to apply deductions from Tier 1 capital for their nonconsolidated investments in banking and 
finance subsidiaries over the 2000-2014 period. Information on this is collected from official 
documents and regulatory forms that BHCs and commercial banks had to file over this 
period.  
 
A distinction is made between: 
 
 Large BHCs that had to file report FR Y-9C to the Federal Reserve 
 Small BHCs that had to file report FR Y-9SP to the Federal Reserve 
 Commercial banks that had to file Call reports to the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examinations Council (FFIEC) 
 
The asset threshold for requiring a BHC to file report FR Y-9C for ‘large BHCs’ increased 
from $ 150 million to $ 500 million in March 2006 (and it was subsequently raised to $ 1 
billion in March 2015). Reporting requirements for large BHCs, small BHCs and commercial 




In 2000, large BHCs reported capital information in Schedule HC-I—Risk-Based Capital. 
No deduction for nonconsolidated investments in banking and finance subsidiaries was 
required.   
 
From March 2001 to December 2013, Schedule HC-R—Regulatory Capital requires a 
deduction of 50% of nonconsolidated investments in banking and finance subsidiaries in item 
10, i.e., other additions to (deductions from) Tier 1 capital. During this period, large BHCs 
are not required to make a deduction for investments in financial subsidiaries (which relate to 
non-banking financial activities that are beyond the scope of this study).  
 
Starting in March 2014, Schedule HC-R—Regulatory Capital has two parts. Part A is the 
same as the historical format during 2001-2013, whereas part B has more items and requires 
richer information. The holding companies using the advanced approach fill out part B, 
whereas other holding companies continued to use part A until the end of 2014. As of March 
2015, part A was abolished and every BHC used only part B. 
 
In part A, BHCs are to report a deduction from Tier 1 capital of 50% of their investments in 
banking and finance subsidiaries that are not consolidated in item 10. Alternatively, in part B 
deductions vary depending on several thresholds regarding the investment.29 
                                                             
29 In particular, a distinction is made between non-significant and significant investments as follows. A banking 
organization has a non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institutions in the 
form of common stock, if it owns equal to or less than 10% of common stock of the unconsolidated affiliate. 
 If aggregate amount of the banking organization’s non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions > the 10% threshold of the banking organization’s Common 
Equity Tier 1 capital after applying certain regulatory adjustments and deductions, then the amount 
above 10% is deducted from the banking organization’s regulatory capital using the deduction 






Throughout 2000-2014, small BHCs are not required to report any deductions from Tier 1 
capital for investments in either investments in banking and finance subsidiaries or 
investments in financial subsidiaries. This implies that during this period there was no 




During 2000, commercial banks did not report any relevant deductions from Tier 1 capital on 
Schedule HC-R—Regulatory Capital. 
 
From March 2001 to December 2013, Schedule HC-R—Regulatory Capital does not 
require a deduction from Tier 1 capital for nonconsolidated investments in banking and 
finance subsidiaries. However, there is a deduction from Tier 1 capital of 50% of 
nonconsolidated investments in financial subsidiaries from Tier 1 capital in item 10, i.e. 
Other additions to (deductions from) Tier 1 capital. 
 
Similarly to form FR Y-9C, from March 2014 Schedule HC-R—Regulatory Capital of the 
call report has two parts. Part A corresponds to the historical version of 2001-2013, whereas 
part B has more items and requires richer information. The commercial banks using advanced 
approaches banks started reporting using B, whereas other banks continued to use part A until 
the end of 2014. From March 2015, Part A was abolished and every bank reports using the 
prior part B. In part A, banks are to report a deduction from Tier 1 of capital of 50% of their 
nonconsolidated investments in financial subsidiaries in item 10. Alternatively, in part B 
deductions vary depending on several thresholds regarding the investment similar those in 
form FR Y-9C.  
 
From March 31, 2014, Part B of Schedule HC-R—Regulatory Capital in both the FR Y-9C 
and Call Report requires deductions from Tier 1 capital related to investments in the capital 
of unconsolidated financial institutions, no longer making a distinction between investments 
in banking and finance subsidiaries versus investments in financial subsidiaries. 
                                                             
 If the non-significant investments is below the 10% threshold, then the amount is risk weighted in the 
usual manner. 
Alternatively, a banking organization has a significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institutions in the form of common stock, if it owns more than 10% of common stock of the unconsolidated 
affiliate.  
 For investment in common stock, the banks needs to apply the threshold deduction approach – amount 
exceeding individual threshold (10% of adjusted Common Equity Tier 1) or aggregate threshold (15% 
of adjusted Common Equity Tier 1) is deducted from banking organization’s Common Equity Tier 1 
capital. Amount not deducted is risk weighted at 250%.  
 For other investments not in the form of common stock, amount is fully deducted from banking 
organization’s regulatory capital using the deduction approach 
Sources: Davis Polk, ‘U.S. Basel III Final Rule: Visual Memorandum’, available from 
http://www.usbasel3.com, and Federal Reserve System (2013). 
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Appendix B. Algorithms to compute adjusted leverage ratios for complex banks 
 
The structure of the bank considered in section 3 is particularly simple as the parent bank has 
only a single subsidiary. In practice, parent banks tend to have more complex corporate 
structures with multiple affiliates that are connected to the parent by multi-layered ownership 
hierarchies. In this subsection, we describe our algorithms for adjusting the reported leverage 
ratio of a more complex bank using the decompression and deduction methods, starting with 
the former. 
 
Consider a bank that generally has n layers, including the parent level. Decompression is 
done from the bottom up. In particular, we first consider whether any subsidiary in the nth 
layer is minority-owned. If not, we next consider whether there is any minority-owned 
subsidiary in the n-1th layer, etc. Generally, let m ≤ n be the lowest layer where any minority-
owned subsidiary is located. This implies that the m-1th layer is the lowest layer where at least 
one reported assets figure can be adjusted by way of decompression. Consider that a bank in 
the m-1th layer has K affiliates that are minority-owned. The decompressed assets of the 
owning bank 𝐴𝑚−1,𝑐 are then calculated as 




                    
                (A1) 
where 𝐴𝑚−1 are the owning bank’s reported assets, 𝛼𝑘 is the ownership share of subsidiary 
k, and 𝐴𝑚,𝑘 and 𝐸𝑚,𝑘 are the assets and equity of subsidiary k. The assets of all banks in 
layer m-1 that have at least one minority-owned subsidiary are decompressed using (A1).  
 
Next, we move one layer up, i.e. to layer m-2. Now consider a bank in this layer that has K 
minority-owned affiliates and L majority-owned subsidiaries. This bank’s assets after 
decompression, 𝐴𝑚−2,𝑐, are given by 
𝐴𝑚−2,𝑐 = 𝐴𝑚−2 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘 × (𝐴𝑚−1,𝑘,𝑐 − 𝐸𝑚−1,𝑘) +
𝐾
𝑘=1




                 (A2) 
where 𝐴𝑚−1,𝑘,𝑐 and 𝐴𝑚−1,𝑙,𝑐 are the assets of affiliates k and l after decompression has been 
considered, i.e. these are the decompressed assets if decompression occurred, and the 
reported assets if decompression was not indicated. The first summation in (A2) reflects a 
generalization of the decompression of minority-owned affiliates in (A1) to take into account 
that the assets of these affiliates may have been decompressed themselves. The second 
summation in (A2) recognizes that the assets of a majority-owned bank, as already 
consolidated in the balance sheet of the directly owning parent bank, have to be increased to 
reflect any prior decompression of its affiliates’ assets. The asset adjustment algorithm in 
(A2) is applied to the reported assets of all banks located in layer m-2. The procedure is next 
applied to all banks in the layer above, and repeated until the assets of the top parent bank 
have been adjusted. This yields a leverage ratio of the parent after decompression, 𝜆𝑝,𝑐, as 
given by 




                  (A3) 
which generalizes equation (1). The leverage ratio after decompression, 𝜆𝑝,𝑐, is generally less 
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Next, we describe how the deduction method of adjusting the leverage ratio of the parent 
bank for minority-owned banks can be generalized to complex banks. Let us consider a bank 
that has Q minority-owned affiliates that can be located at any layer in the bank (apart from 
the top layer). In particular, consider a subsidiary q that is located in layer m with equity 𝐸𝑠,𝑞. 
The ownership chain from the parent bank to this subsidiary q involves m - 1 ownership 
shares 𝛼1,𝑞 , 𝛼2,𝑞 , ⋯ , 𝛼𝑚−1,𝑞 from the parent to subsidiary q.  
 
The deduction Dq from the parent’s reported equity 𝐸1 to account for minority-owned 
subsidiary q is computed as 𝛼1,𝑞 × 𝛼2,𝑞 × ⋯ × 𝛼𝑚−1,𝑞 × 𝐸𝑠,𝑞. The parent’s adjusted leverage 
ratio after deduction, 𝜆𝑝,𝑑, accounts for the deductions required for all Q minority-owned 
affiliates as follows 
𝜆𝑝,𝑑 =





                 (A4) 
which generalizes equation (2) in the main text of the paper.  
 
In Table B1, we display the example of the corporate structure of a BHC called Middle 
Georgia Corporation consisting of three layers. Middle Georgia Corporation has a single 
minority-owned bank in the second layer. We adjust the reported leverage ratio for Middle 
Georgia Corporation using both the decompression and deduction algorithms. In this 













CBA Bankshares, Inc. 
 (Lower-tier BHC) 
 │100% 
3rd layer Citizens Bank of Americus 
 (Non-member bank) 
 
Percentages are ownership percentages. Non-member bank refers to a commercial bank that is state-
chartered and not a member of the Federal Reserve System. Source: Control relationship database 
from the National Information Center (NIC). 
 
A subsidiary in the second layer, CBA Bankshares, Inc., is minority-owned by the top-tier BHC, 
Middle Georgia Corporation, with an equity ownership is 27%. The method of leverage ratio 
adjustment by way of decompression starts at the second layer. The reported leverage ratio is 0.076; 
















Appendix C. Regulatory classification of financial institutions 
This appendix lists categories of financial institutions that do and do not file regulatory reports in the 
form of Call reports, forms Y9-C, and forms Y9-SP. Foreign banks, for instance, do not file standard 
regulatory reports in the US. 
  
Regulatory reports No regulatory reports 
Code Type Code Type 
AGB Agreement Corporation - Banking DPS Data Processing Servicer 
AGI Agreement Corporation – 
Investment 
FBH Foreign Banking Organization as a 
BHC 
BHC Bank Holding Company FBK Foreign Bank 
CPB Cooperative Bank FBO Foreign Banking Organization 
DEO Domestic Entity Other FCU Federal Credit Union 
EDB Edge Corporation - Banking FEO Foreign Entity Other 
EDI Edge Corporation - Investment FHF Financial Holding Company/FBO 
FSB Federal Savings Bank FNC Finance Company 
MTC Non-deposit Trust Company 
Member 
IBK International Bank of a US 
Depository - Edge or Trust Co. 
NAT National Bank INB International Non-bank Subs of 
Domestic Entities 
NMB Non-member Bank NTC Non-deposit Trust Company - Non-
member 
SAL Savings & Loan Association SBD Securities Broker/Dealer 
SLH Savings and Loan Holding 
Company 
  
SMB State Member Bank 
  
SSB State Savings Bank 
  
 




Appendix D. Variable descriptions and data sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Z-score Index of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR is 
ratio of equity to assets, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets calculated over a one-
and-half-year rolling window comprising 3 observations. ROA is defined as net income to total assets. 
Y9-SP 
Earnings volatility Standard deviation of return on equity calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window comprising 
3 observations. Return on equity is defined as net income to equity. 
Y9-SP 
Minority ownership Dummy variable that equals one if a bank has minority ownership of at least one subsidiary NIC 
Minority ownership share Share of a bank’s affiliates that is minority-owned NIC 
Reported leverage ratio Ratio of equity to assets  Y9-SP 




Leverage ratio after deduction Ratio of equity net of equity investments in minority-owned affiliates to assets  Call Report, 
Y9-SP 
Absolute adjustment with 
decompression 
Difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after decompression Call Report, 
Y9-SP 
Relative adjustment with 
decompression  
Difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after decompression divided by 
the reported leverage ratio 
Call Report, 
Y9-SP 
Absolute adjustment with deduction  Difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after deduction Call Report, 
Y9-SP 
Relative adjustment with deduction Difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after deduction divided by the 
reported leverage ratio 
Call Report, 
Y9-SP 
Size Natural logarithm of assets  Y9-SP 
Asset growth Real growth rate of assets divided by GDP deflator Y9-SP 
Concentration Share of bank assets in county of location Y9-SP 
Number of offspring Total number of offspring at various levels NIC 
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Figure 1. Balance sheets for a parent bank with a minority-owned subsidiary bank 
 




















Parent after decompression 
𝐴𝑝
𝑜  𝐿𝑝 




Figure 2. The number of layers of banks with and without minority ownership 
 
 
Note: Only reporting affiliates are taken into account. 
 
 
Figure 3.The number of affiliates of banks with and without minority ownership  
 
 
Note: Only reporting affiliates are taken into account.  
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Figure 4. Reported leverage ratio and leverage ratio after decompression, 2000-2013 
 
 
Notes: The reported leverage ratio is ratio of equity to assets. The leverage ratio after decompression is ratio of 
equity to assets after consolidation of minority-owned affiliates. The leverage ratios are annual means based on 
biannual data.  
 
Figure 5. Absolute and relative adjustments with decompression, 2000-2013 
 
 
Notes: The absolute adjustment with decompression is the difference of the ratio of equity to assets and the ratio 
of equity to assets after consolidation of minority-owned affiliates. The relative adjustment with decompression 
is the difference of the ratio of equity to assets and the ratio of equity to assets after consolidation of minority-





Figure 6. Leverage ratio after decompression plotted against reported leverage ratio 
 
 
Notes: The reported leverage ratio is the ratio of equity to assets. The leverage ratio after decompression is the 
ratio of equity to assets after consolidation of minority-owned affiliates. The sample consists of BHCs for which 
decompression is possible.  
 
Figure 7. A comparison of leverage ratio reductions through decompression and deduction 
 
 
Notes: The reported leverage ratio is the ratio of equity to assets. The leverage ratio after decompression is the 
ratio of equity to assets after consolidation of minority-owned affiliates. The leverage ratio after deduction is 
ratio of equity net of equity investments in minority-owned affiliates to assets. The figure does not show 
observations where the leverage ratio after deduction is negative. The sample consists of BHCs for which capital 




Table 1. A numerical example of decompression and deduction 
 
Consider a parent bank with total assets, 𝐴𝑝, of 1000 dollars that owns 40 % of the equity of a 
subsidiary bank with assets, 𝐴𝑠, of 500 dollars. The equity of the subsidiary, 𝐸𝑠 is 40. The parent’s 
ownership share, α, of the subsidiary’s equity is 40%. The parent’s ownership of the subsidiary’ 
equity, α𝐸𝑠, thus is 16. The parent’s other assets, 𝐴𝑝
𝑜 , amount to 984. The parent’s equity, 𝐸𝑝, is 80, 















The parent’s leverage ratio, 𝜆𝑝 =
𝐸𝑝
𝐴𝑝
, is 0.08. The leverage ratio after decompression, 𝜆𝑝,𝑐 = 
𝜆𝑝
1+αρ(1−𝜆𝑠)
 is 0.068. The absolute adjustment with decompression, 𝛿𝑐,𝑎 = 𝜆𝑝 − 𝜆𝑝,𝑐 , is 0.012, while 
the relative adjustment with decompression, 𝛿𝑐,𝑟 =
𝜆𝑝−𝜆𝑝,𝑐
𝜆𝑝
, is 0.15. The leverage ratio after 
deduction, 𝜆𝑝,𝑑 = 𝜆𝑝 − αρ𝜆𝑠, is 0.064. The absolute adjustment with deduction, 𝛿𝑑,𝑎 = 𝜆𝑝 − 𝜆𝑝,𝑑 , 
is 0.16, while the relative adjustment under deduction, 𝛿𝑑,𝑟 =
𝜆𝑝−𝜆𝑝,𝑑
𝜆𝑝
, is 0.2. The bias is the leverage 














Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Z-score is index of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR is 
ratio of equity to assets, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets calculated over a one-and-half-
year rolling window. Earnings volatility is standard deviation of return on equity calculated over a one-and-half-
year rolling window. Reported leverage ratio is ratio of equity to assets. Leverage ratio after decompression is 
ratio of equity to assets after consolidation of minority-owned affiliates. Absolute adjustment with 
decompression is difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after decompression. 
Relative adjustment with decompression is difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio 
after decompression divided by the reported leverage ratio. Leverage ratio after deduction is ratio of equity net 
of equity investments in minority-owned affiliates to assets. Absolute adjustment with deduction is difference 
between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after deduction. Relative adjustment with deduction is 
difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after deduction divided by the reported 
leverage ratio. Size is natural logarithm of assets. Asset growth is growth rate of assets. Concentration is share 
of bank assets in county of location. Number of offspring is the total number of offspring at various levels. Panel 
A considers sample of banks for which decompression is possible. Panel B considers sample of BHCs for which 
deduction is possible. 
 
Panel A: Decompression sample Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Z-score 536 3.5615 0.8621 0.4082 5.7079 
Earnings volatility 542 0.0479 0.0743 0.0016 0.5352 
Reported leverage ratio 542 0.1004 0.0858 0.0001 0.3565 
Leverage ratio after decompression 542 0.0637 0.0459 0.0001 0.1638 
Absolute adjustment with decompression 542 0.0367 0.0564 0.0000 0.2733 
Relative adjustment with decompression 542 0.2646 0.1765 0.0091 0.7756 
Size 542 11.2210 1.0196 8.1286 12.9945 
Asset growth 542 0.0351 0.1074 -0.4492 0.4800 
Concentration 542 0.0222 0.0786 0.0000 0.4918 
Number of offspring 542 3.3801 1.6650 2.0000 10.0000 
Panel B: Deduction sample Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Z-score 812 3.5477 0.8726 0.4082 5.7079 
Earnings volatility 824 0.0493 0.0759 0.0016 0.5352 
Reported leverage ratio 824 0.0940 0.0864 0.0001 0.3565 
Leverage ratio after deduction 824 0.0432 0.0631 -0.0515 0.2149 
Absolute adjustment with deduction 824 0.0513 0.0636 0.0005 0.3490 
Relative adjustment with deduction 824 0.8068 0.7597 0.0451 5.4226 
Size 824 11.3482 0.9753 8.1286 12.9945 
Asset growth 824 0.0343 0.1056 -0.4492 0.4800 
Concentration 824 0.0188 0.0666 0.0000 0.4918 
Number of offspring 824 3.8434 1.8448 2.0000 12.0000 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
Z-score is index of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR is ratio of equity to assets, and σ(ROA) is the standard 
deviation of return on assets calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window. Earnings volatility is standard deviation of return on equity calculated over a one-and-half-
year rolling window. Reported leverage ratio is ratio of equity to assets. Leverage ratio after decompression is ratio of equity to assets after consolidation of minority-owned 
affiliates. Absolute adjustment with decompression is difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after decompression. Relative adjustment with 
decompression is difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after decompression divided by the reported leverage ratio. Leverage ratio after 
deduction is ratio of equity net of equity investments in minority-owned affiliates to assets. Absolute adjustment with deduction is difference between the reported leverage 
ratio and the leverage ratio after deduction. Relative adjustment with deduction is difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after deduction divided 
by the reported leverage ratio. Size is natural logarithm of assets. Asset growth is growth rate of assets. Concentration is share of bank assets in county of location. Number of 
offspring is the total number of offspring at various levels. Panel A considers sample of banks for which decompression is possible. Panel B considers sample of banks for 
which deduction is possible. All variables apart from Z-score, earnings volatility and number of offspring are lagged one period. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Sample of banks for which decompression is possible  
 





















Z-score 1          
Earnings volatility -0.7519*** 1         
Reported leverage ratio 0.1252*** -0.1438*** 1        
Leverage ratio after decompression 0.1779*** -0.1638*** 0.8020*** 1       
Absolute adjustment with decompression 0.0440 -0.0845** 0.8716*** 0.4067*** 1      
Relative adjustment with decompression -0.0554 0.0008 0.6698*** 0.2343*** 0.8322*** 1     
Size -0.0633 0.1186*** -0.6761*** -0.3100*** -0.7808*** -0.7143*** 1    
Asset growth 0.0799* -0.1038** -0.1008** -0.0730* -0.0923** -0.1194*** 0.1105*** 1   
Concentration -0.1682*** 0.1585*** -0.1408*** -0.1014** -0.1313*** -0.2012*** 0.2778*** 0.0149 1  








Panel B. Sample of banks for which deduction is possible  
 





















Z-score 1          
Earnings volatility -0.7735*** 1         
Reported leverage ratio 0.0506 -0.1065*** 1        
Leverage ratio after deduction 0.0883** -0.1320*** 0.6961*** 1       
Absolute adjustment with deduction -0.0245 -0.0089 0.6731*** -0.0530 1      
Relative adjustment with deduction -0.0773** 0.0771** -0.3319*** -0.5603*** 0.1127*** 1     
Size 0.0209 0.0389 -0.6191*** -0.2288*** -0.6301*** 0.0568 1    
Asset growth 0.0863** -0.1011*** -0.1005*** -0.0334 -0.1143*** 0.0597* 0.0927*** 1   
Concentration -0.1811*** 0.1542*** -0.1012*** -0.0356 -0.1038*** -0.0797** 0.2211*** 0.0413 1  
Number of offspring 0.0368 -0.0349 0.0995*** 0.2130*** -0.0831** -0.1314*** 0.2286*** 0.0693** -0.0397 1 
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Table 4.  The propensity of BHCs to have minority-owned affiliates 
 
This table displays correlations. Minority ownership is a dummy variable indicating whether a BHC has a minority-owned subsidiary in its hierarchical structure. Minority 
ownership share is the number of minority-owned affiliates divided by the number offspring at various levels. Reported leverage ratio is ratio of equity to assets. Size is 
natural logarithm of assets. Asset growth is growth rate of assets. Concentration is share of bank assets in county of location. Number of offspring is the total number of 














 Minority ownership  Minority ownership share 
Minority ownership  1  
Minority ownership share 0.7610*** 1 
Reported leverage ratio -0.0039 0.0104*** 
Size 0.0062* -0.0270*** 
Asset growth -0.0000 -0.0066* 
Concentration -0.0061* -0.0013 
Number of offspring 0.2056*** 0.0845*** 
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Table 5. Bank risk and capital following decompression method 
  
The dependent variable in regressions 1-6 is Z-score, which is an index of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR is ratio 
of equity to assets, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window. The dependent variable in regressions 7-12 is 
earnings volatility which is the standard deviation of return on equity calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window. Reported leverage ratio is ratio of equity to assets. 
Relative adjustment with decompression is difference between the reported leverage ratio and leverage ratio after decompression divided by the reported leverage ratio where 
leverage ratio after decompression is ratio of equity to assets after consolidation of minority-owned affiliates. Absolute adjustment with decompression is difference between 
the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after decompression. Size is natural logarithm of assets. Asset growth is growth rate of assets. Concentration is share of bank 
assets in county of location. Number of offspring is the total number of offspring at various levels. All independent variables except number of offspring are lagged one 
period. Time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Sample includes banks with minority ownership for which decompression is 
possible. The pre-crisis period is 2000q1-2007q2, while the crisis and aftermath period is 2007q3-2013q4. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
  Z score Earnings volatility 
 Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis and aftermath Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis and aftermath 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Reported leverage ratio 3.315** 3.711 3.054** 2.873 3.519* 4.029 -0.206** -0.245* -0.179** -0.201 -0.220* -0.239 
 (1.489) (2.280) (1.521) (2.439) (1.835) (2.505) (0.087) (0.128) (0.080) (0.129) (0.119) (0.157) 
Relative adjustment with decompression -1.570***  -1.736**  -1.428**  0.107***  0.081**  0.118**  
(0.534)  (0.689)  (0.616)  (0.038)  (0.031)  (0.053)  
Absolute adjustment with 
decompression 
 -3.926  -2.097  -4.415*  0.295*  0.168  0.312 
 (2.378)  (3.200)  (2.316)  (0.164)  (0.150)  (0.214) 
Size 0.022 0.054 0.035 0.141 0.016 0.023 0.006 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.009 0.007 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.176) (0.173) (0.125) (0.124) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) 
Asset growth 0.538 0.669 0.251 0.405 0.621 0.715 -0.075** -0.084** 0.010 0.001 -0.134** -0.142** 
 (0.420) (0.428) (0.787) (0.766) (0.417) (0.428) (0.033) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027) (0.053) (0.055) 
Concentration -2.186*** -1.894** -0.971 -0.707 -2.952*** -2.687** 0.148*** 0.127* 0.017 0.002 0.216*** 0.197** 
 (0.704) (0.900) (0.609) (0.756) (0.946) (1.115) (0.050) (0.066) (0.030) (0.044) (0.071) (0.087) 
Number of offspring -0.013 -0.011 -0.002 0.004 -0.018 -0.017 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.057) (0.060) (0.066) (0.075) (0.057) (0.058) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Number of observations 536 536 231 231 305 305 542 542 233 233 309 309 
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R-squared 0.131 0.099 0.123 0.073 0.141 0.118 0.140 0.121 0.087 0.068 0.178 0.158 
Number of banks 78 78 61 61 40 40 79 79 62 62 40 40 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 6. Bank risk and capital following decompression method including banks without minority ownership 
  
The dependent variable in regressions 1-6 is Z-score, which is an index of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR is ratio 
of equity to assets, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window. The dependent variable in regressions 7-12 is 
earnings volatility which is the standard deviation of return on equity calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window. Reported leverage ratio is ratio of equity to assets. 
Relative adjustment with decompression is difference between the reported leverage ratio and leverage ratio after decompression divided by the reported leverage ratio where 
leverage ratio after decompression is ratio of equity to assets after consolidation of minority-owned affiliates. Absolute adjustment with decompression is difference between 
the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after decompression. Size is natural logarithm of assets. Asset growth is growth rate of assets. Concentration is share of bank 
assets in county of location. Number of offspring is the total number of offspring at various levels. All independent variables except number of offspring are lagged one 
period. Time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Sample includes banks with minority ownership for which decompression is 
possible and banks without minority ownership. The pre-crisis period is 2000q1-2007q2, while the crisis and aftermath period is 2007q3-2013q4. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Z score Earnings volatility 
 Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis and aftermath Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis and aftermath 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Reported leverage ratio 5.944*** 5.982*** 4.214*** 4.249*** 7.110*** 7.151*** -0.447*** -0.449*** -0.238*** -0.240*** -0.586*** -0.588*** 
 (0.205) (0.205) (0.223) (0.223) (0.274) (0.275) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.026) 
Relative adjustment with decompression -0.425  -0.199  -0.650*  0.040**  0.023*  0.056*  
 (0.272)  (0.251)  (0.387)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.030)  
Absolute adjustment with decompression  -3.155***  -2.001***  -4.607***  0.225***  0.115***  0.346*** 
  (0.648)  (0.763)  (0.807)  (0.036)  (0.024)  (0.074) 
Size -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.014 -0.014 -0.001* -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset growth -0.064 -0.064 -0.610*** -0.610*** 0.368*** 0.367*** -0.055*** -0.055*** 0.003 0.003 -0.097*** -0.097*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.080) (0.080) (0.092) (0.092) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Concentration -0.039 -0.039 -0.096 -0.097 -0.010 -0.010 -0.000 -0.000 0.010* 0.010* -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.065) (0.065) (0.057) (0.057) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Number of offspring -0.009 -0.009 -0.015** -0.015* -0.002 -0.002 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of observations 76447 76447 31258 31258 45189 45189 76889 76889 31296 31296 45593 45593 
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R-squared 0.100 0.100 0.079 0.080 0.118 0.118 0.107 0.107 0.065 0.065 0.127 0.127 
Number of banks 4834 4834 4092 4092 4304 4304 4837 4837 4094 4094 4308 4308 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 7. Means of the samples including banks where decompression is possible with and without matching 
 
Reported leverage ratio is ratio of equity to assets. Size is natural logarithm of assets. Asset growth is growth rate of assets. Concentration is share of bank assets in county of 
location. Number of offspring is the total number of offspring at various levels. Columns 1-3 refer to a sample including all banks where decompression is possible and all 
banks without minority ownership. Columns 4-6 refer to a sample of banks where decompression is possible and banks without minority ownership constructed by way of 
propensity score matching on the basis of the five variables in the table. T-test concerns test of equal means. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  No matching Matching 
 Banks after 
decompression 
Banks with no 
minority 
ownership 




Banks with no 
minority 
ownership 
T-test of equal 
means 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reported leverage ratio 0.1022 0.1019 0.0003 0.0985 0.0930 0.0055 
Size 11.2001   11.4818  -0.2817*** 11.2267 11.1694  0.0573 
Asset growth 0.0390 0.0458 -0.0068  0.0360 0.0472 -0.0112 
Concentration 0.0222 0.0316 -0.0094* 0.0223  0.0273 -0.0050 

















Table 8. Bank risk and capital following decompression method for the matched sample 
  
The dependent variable in regressions 1-6 is Z-score, which is an index of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR is ratio 
of equity to assets, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window (3 observations). The dependent variable in 
regressions 7-12 is earnings volatility which is the standard deviation of return on equity calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window (3 observations). Reported 
leverage ratio is ratio of equity to assets. Relative adjustment with decompression is difference between the reported leverage ratio and leverage ratio after decompression 
divided by the reported leverage ratio where leverage ratio after decompression is ratio of equity to assets after consolidation of minority-owned affiliates. Absolute 
adjustment with decompression is difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after decompression. Size is natural logarithm of assets. Asset growth 
is growth rate of assets. Concentration is share of bank assets in county of location. Number of offspring is the total number of offspring at various levels. All independent 
variables except number of offspring are lagged one period. Time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Sample includes banks 
with minority ownership for which decompression is possible and banks without minority ownership selected by propensity score matching. The pre-crisis period is 2000q1-
2007q2, while the crisis and aftermath period is 2007q3-2013q4. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Z score Earnings volatility 
 Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis and aftermath Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis and aftermath 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Reported leverage ratio 3.464*** 4.421*** 2.387* 2.722* 4.253*** 5.554*** -0.210*** -0.253*** -0.154** -0.179** -0.245*** -0.295*** 
 (1.208) (1.503) (1.243) (1.515) (1.457) (1.732) (0.061) (0.073) (0.064) (0.081) (0.075) (0.085) 
Relative adjustment with decompression -0.427  -0.191  -0.675  0.022  0.016  0.031  
 (0.298)  (0.311)  (0.417)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.025)  
Absolute adjustment with decompression  -3.354**  -1.194  -5.037***  0.157**  0.093  0.206** 
  (1.437)  (1.819)  (1.588)  (0.064)  (0.079)  (0.081) 
Size 0.059 0.038 0.085 0.077 0.040 0.013 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.081) (0.081) (0.067) (0.066) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asset growth -0.162 -0.157 -0.865 -0.844 0.448 0.423 -0.032 -0.033 0.031 0.029 -0.088*** -0.087*** 
 (0.368) (0.377) (0.525) (0.526) (0.504) (0.510) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) 
Concentration -0.579 -0.502 0.317 0.353 -1.166 -1.063 0.031 0.027 -0.009 -0.012 0.056 0.052 
 (0.965) (0.986) (0.801) (0.813) (1.154) (1.185) (0.053) (0.055) (0.028) (0.029) (0.074) (0.076) 
Number of offspring -0.049 -0.043 -0.074 -0.072 -0.032 -0.026 0.003 0.002 0.004* 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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Number of observations 1034 1034 443 443 591 591 1034 1034 443 443 591 591 
R-squared 0.074 0.080 0.078 0.078 0.088 0.097 0.074 0.077 0.066 0.066 0.089 0.092 
Number of banks 462 462 290 290 227 227 462 462 290 290 227 227 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 9. Bank risk and capital following deduction method 
  
The dependent variable in regressions 1-6 is Z-score, which is an index of bank solvency constructed as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is return on assets, CAR is ratio 
of equity to assets, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window (3 observations). The dependent variable in 
regressions 7-12 is earnings volatility which is the standard deviation of return on equity calculated over a one-and-half-year rolling window (3 observations). Reported 
leverage ratio is ratio of equity to assets. Relative adjustment with deduction is difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after deduction divided 
by the reported leverage ratio where leverage ratio after deduction is ratio of equity net of equity investments in minority-owned affiliates to assets. Absolute adjustment with 
deduction is difference between the reported leverage ratio and the leverage ratio after deduction. Size is natural logarithm of assets. Asset growth is growth rate of assets. 
Concentration is share of bank assets in county of location. Number of offspring is the total number of offspring at various levels. All independent variables except number of 
offspring are lagged one period. Time fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Sample includes banks with minority ownership for 
which deduction is possible. The pre-crisis period is 2000q1-2007q2, while the crisis and aftermath period is 2007q3-2013q4. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Z score Earnings volatility 
 Full sample Pre-crisis Crises and aftermath Full sample Pre-crisis Crises and aftermath 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Reported leverage ratio 1.196 1.841 0.687 1.773 1.290 1.926 -0.136* -0.196** -0.076 -0.142** -0.168 -0.231* 
 (1.239) (1.182) (1.426) (1.246) (1.469) (1.404) (0.081) (0.086) (0.066) (0.071) (0.106) (0.118) 
Relative adjustment with deduction -0.087  -0.238*  -0.039  0.006  0.011**  0.002  
 (0.062)  (0.123)  (0.069)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
Absolute adjustment with deduction  -0.915  -0.386  -1.250  0.115*  0.089  0.139* 
  (0.855)  (1.396)  (0.988)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.083) 
Size 0.149 0.140 0.103 0.162 0.156 0.133 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.102) (0.104) (0.162) (0.165) (0.113) (0.114) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) 
Asset growth 0.758* 0.712 0.775 0.517 0.859* 0.844* -0.074** -0.070** 0.008 0.022 -0.152*** -0.150*** 
 (0.427) (0.439) (0.697) (0.751) (0.488) (0.478) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.035) (0.042) (0.041) 
Concentration -2.860*** -2.751*** -2.175 -2.071 -3.324*** -3.238*** 0.200*** 0.192*** 0.113 0.106 0.241*** 0.235*** 
 (0.749) (0.740) (1.406) (1.464) (0.817) (0.813) (0.049) (0.048) (0.088) (0.089) (0.070) (0.071) 
Number of offspring -0.016 -0.015 -0.022 -0.020 -0.011 -0.011 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.043) (0.042) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
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Number of observations 812 812 340 340 472 472 824 824 344 344 480 480 
R-squared 0.088 0.085 0.090 0.065 0.096 0.098 0.111 0.112 0.063 0.056 0.138 0.142 
Number of banks 113 113 91 91 60 60 115 115 94 94 60 60 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Level of clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
 
  
